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XI.8 Scientific experts in WTO dispute settlement
David A Wirth*
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, USA
Abstract
Engaging with scientific expertise is necessary to insure the effectiveness of WTO dispute 
settlement in areas such as the SPS Agreement. In rejecting the Uruguay Round texts 
and basic principles concerning the processing of policy-relevant science for lay decision 
makers, panels and the Appellate Body have counterproductively tended to undermine 
the scientific integrity, institutional legitimacy, and ultimately the speed and efficacy of 
WTO dispute settlement.
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XI.8.2 Panel and Appellate Body practice
XI.8.1 Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round self-consciously added a new scientific dimension to trade-based 
disciplines, and consequently dispute settlement. In addition to the SPS Agreement, 
where the role of science is most obvious, the TBT Agreement could also be expected to 
raise scientific questions. The Article XX exceptions from GATT 1947, especially para-
graph (b), similarly could be anticipated to engage questions of the relationship between 
a challenged measure and its scientific underpinning.
Principled reservations about the integrity of panel and Appellate Body review of 
scientific issues in anticipated WTO agreements, along with analogous provisions in the 
roughly contemporaneous NAFTA, were highlighted in public policy debates during 
negotiations, well before the Uruguay Round was adopted. Presumably with those 
concerns as a background, the Uruguay Round expressly addresses panel and Appellate 
Body consultation with scientific experts in two contexts.
The DSU (Annex 4) text anticipates that “a panel may request an advisory report in 
writing from an expert review group.” An expert review group is established by the panel, 
* The author gratefully acknowledges assistance and comments from Jeffery Atik, Richard 
Bissell, Sherry Xin Chen, Jacqueline Peel, Charles Weiss and David Winickoff, along with the 
research assistance of Pantelis Takos. The responsibility for all views expressed in this chapter, 
however, is the author’s own. This project was supported by a generous research grant from the 
Boston College Law School Fund. Portions of this project draw on the author’s previously pub-
lished writings.
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reports to it, and responds to the terms of reference established by the panel. Members are 
independent personalities appointed in their individual capacities. Expert review groups 
may seek advice from “any source they deem appropriate.” An expert review group pre-
pares a draft report, which is to be made available to the parties to the dispute for comment, 
and a final version, which is transmitted to the panel and “shall be advisory only.”
The TBT Agreement (Appendix 2) establishes a very similar process, an embellish-
ment of a precursor in the Tokyo Round Standards Code, where the analogous institu-
tion is known as a “technical expert group.” The contemporaneous NAFTA contains a 
comparable provision under which dispute settlement panels can request a written report 
from a “scientific review board” established either by the dispute settlement panel itself 
or at the urging of a disputing party.
In prescribing the format for panels and the Appellate Body to solicit expert scientific 
input, the drafters of the Uruguay Round were building on a rich and lengthy transna-
tional history prescribing good practice standards for lay decision makers to tap techni-
cal expertise in evaluating questions of policy-relevant science. In the United States, these 
include the National Academies of Sciences/National Research Council study commit-
tees and the Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Advisory Board. Expert panels 
convened by The Royal Society (UK) and its counterparts in other Commonwealth 
countries such as Canada and New Zealand, operate along similar models.
Among international organizations, the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
monographs and the assessment reports of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) establish standards for group undertakings involving technical experts 
in framing scientific issues for governmental authorities and the public. Tellingly in 
view of its role in the SPS Agreement, Codex Alimentarius’s science-based work in such 
areas as pesticide residues and food additives conform to the basic model. So, too, do 
the Scientific Committee and panels established under the exclusively science-focused 
European Food Safety Authority, constituted after the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round.
Although the details vary from one institutional setting to another, core features rep-
licated in the Uruguay Round texts include: (1) the establishment of a collective, expert 
group as a distinct entity; (2) peer-to-peer interactions of group members in search of 
common ground; and (3) preparation of a consensus report (although some settings 
admit of the inclusion of minority views). Experience with this model demonstrates that 
such scientific advisory committees can effectively distill the best scientific thinking on 
disputed policy-relevant science – frequently characterized by uncertainty – while reduc-
ing disagreement and framing scientific questions for lay decision makers in an opera-
tionally useful manner.
XI.8.2 Panel and Appellate Body practice
The WTO Analytical Index confirms that no expert group has ever been established 
under either of the two Uruguay Round authorities. In Hormones I,1 the first dispute in 
1 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, World Trade Organization 
Appellate Body, 16 January 1998, paras 146–49 and 253(f).
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which the question of context with technical experts arose, the panel jettisoned the DSU 
text and instead sought input from particular scientific experts in the field and the Codex 
Commission secretariat on an ad hoc, individual basis through the submission of written 
questions to each expert and subsequent in-person meetings involving each expert and 
the panel. No expert group was convened, nor was there a consensus report from the 
experts as a group.
The Appellate Body affirmed this approach as an acceptable alternative to the proce-
dures specified in the Uruguay Round agreements. It has been followed without excep-
tion since, including in disputes arising under the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1947 
disciplines. Indeed, the formula for consultation with scientific experts established in 
Hormones I was subsequently refined and codified, but without apparent modifications 
to reflect the original intent of the Uruguay Round texts.
WTO dispute settlement is unusual as a rule-of-law, adjudicatory, adversarial, multi-
level interaction between sovereign regulatory authorities and a multilateral organiza-
tion, constituted to evaluate compliance with the negative trade disciplines. The existing 
literature focuses on panels’ authority, and the legality vel non of panels rejecting the 
Uruguay Round texts, relying on a legalistic interpretation of the word “may.” But the 
question of consultation with scientific experts instead is much broader, engaging first 
principles of sound public policy and scientific legitimacy.
The models on which the Uruguay Round expert group texts appear to rely are 
designed to provide advice to public officials primarily operating in generic, prospective 
legislative, regulatory or policy-making modes, such as those that gave rise to the EC 
hormone ban in the first instance. Sometimes, however, a collaborative group approach 
has also been deployed in a retrospective, oversight mode, which is more similar to WTO 
dispute settlement.
Notably, however, non-technically expert courts and judges engaged in judicial review 
of governmental decision making predicated on policy-relevant science typically do not 
seek the advice of technical experts.2 There, the emphasis tends to be on deference and 
the standard of review – another contested area of WTO jurisprudence.
When the application of trade-based disciplines hinge on governments’ determina-
tions with respect to sometimes controversial questions of policy-relevant science, as in 
the SPS Agreement and the Hormones dispute, the adjudication of scientific questions 
are well-nigh unavoidable. By comparison with the alternative expert review group 
process prescribed in the DSU, the process employed in Hormones I and thereafter 
can be expected to result in the concentration of authority – and responsibility – for 
the identification and evaluation of scientific questions in the hands of the lay panel 
members.
Hormones II3 provides an illustrative example of the attributes, and the perils, of the 
practice of WTO panels. After rejecting the EC’s request for the creation of an expert 
review group as prescribed by the DSU, the panel published working procedures for 
2 This situation is entirely distinct from a setting such as toxic torts in which judges of necessity 
must reach their own conclusions with respect to scientific integrity. Cf. Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – 
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R, 16 October 2008, paras 585–615 and 736(c)(v).
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consultations with scientific and technical experts. Consistent with practice to date, those 
included written questions and an oral hearing directed by the panel chair, with a tran-
script published as an annex to the panel’s report.
The Appellate Body’s review of this process was scathing, exposing the deficien-
cies in a process of consultation with scientific experts that has now become standard. 
After noting that the purpose of expert advice is to verify that the scientific basis for the 
measure comes from a qualified and respected source, the Appellate Body observed that 
inquiry is to be made “irrespective of whether it represents minority or majority scientific 
views.”
Instead, in synthesizing the scientific advice it had received, the panel had explicitly 
“followed the majority of experts expressing scientific views” (emphasis added). The 
panel itself had, moreover, “somewhat peremptorily decided what it considered to be the 
best science.” The Appellate Body consequently concluded that the panel’s analysis was 
inconsistent with its task of engaging in an objective assessment of the data underlying 
the EC’s risk assessment. Unable to complete the analysis on critical issues, the Appellate 
Body rejected the panel’s findings while in effect leaving the dispute undecided.
Reliance on the opinion of a majority of scientific experts is exactly the sort of funda-
mental error that the Uruguay Round texts are designed to prevent. An expert review 
group’s report would be expected to address precisely the dynamics of the scientific ques-
tions which the panel decided for itself.
Moreover, the trajectory of the Hormones dispute is revealing in response to concerns 
about speed, one of the principal criticisms of a consensus-building process involving a 
balanced group of respected experts to address a scientific or technical issue. More than 
a decade after the creation of the WTO, Hormones II was the latest – and ultimately, 
from a jurisprudential point of view, inconclusive – iteration of litigation in the seminal 
dispute that gave rise to the SPS Agreement in the first place.
In arrogating to themselves an inappropriate role in the scientific decision-making 
process, the panel members in effect applied an insufficiently deferential standard of 
review and improperly diminished the requisite margin of appreciation allowed for the 
Member maintaining the measure. Meanwhile, the underlying models have evolved. 
For example, the US National Academies of Science over the last decade have refined 
a “fast-track” process to meet urgent needs, applied most notably in the context of the 
COVID pandemic.
At a time of upheaval within the WTO itself, the potential chilling effect of WTO 
adjudication on the exercise of domestic regulatory authority and the legitimacy of the 
scientific integrity of WTO dispute settlement are topics of ongoing concern. In a system 
unburdened by the force of binding precedent, future panels, the Appellate Body, and 
the DSB should reexamine working procedures for consultation with scientific and 
 technical experts at the earliest opportunity.
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